

Exploring User-Provided Connectivity A Simple Model

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


Outline

- Background and motivations
- Model formulation
- Analysis overview
- Results and their interpretation
- Extensions


What Is “User-Provided Connectivity”?

- In a UPC system, some users allow other users to access their own connectivity
 - FON, Keywif, Community-based networks
- Different compensation schemes
 - Reciprocation, payments, or cost sharing
- An organic growth model
 - Service value depends on (grows?) with its user-base
- A simple example




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Why “User-Provided Connectivity”?

- We want connectivity everywhere, all the time
 - Wireless technology has brought us very close to truly ubiquitous physical connectivity
- But, traditional “infrastructure” solutions, *e.g.*, cellular, have a high up-front cost as well as capacity limitations
- UPC offers an alternative, organic growth option
 - Limited up-front cost, and increasing capacity as more users join
 - But UPC systems face “bootstrapping” issues (positive and negative externalities)

Q: When and how can a UPC solution succeed?

Modeling UPC Adoption (Or Not)

- A model should allow us to characterize adoption outcomes as a function of exogenous parameters and users behavior
- Among a large user population, individual users adopt if the *utility* they derive from the UPC service is non-negative
- A user's utility should capture
 - Value of basic (home) connectivity
 - Value of connectivity while “roaming”
 - Impact of roaming traffic on home connectivity
 - Incentives for accommodating roaming traffic
 - Service price



Involve externalities


and allow *heterogeneity* in how users value the service

A General Users' Utility

- Users are heterogeneous in their propensity to seek connectivity “away from home,” *i.e.*, their roaming profile
 - Captured by a roaming random variable θ
 - Known distribution
 - $\theta \in [0,1]$, $\theta = 0$ (never roams), $\theta = 1$ (always roaming)
- Utility function of user with roaming value θ
$$U(\theta) = F(\theta,x)+G(\theta,m) - p_\theta$$
 - $F(.,.)$ is utility of connectivity (at home and while roaming)
 - x is current level of adoption (coverage assumed function of adoption)
 - $G(.,.)$ accounts for negative impact of roaming traffic, and positive impact of possible compensation
 - m is current volume of roaming traffic (depends on number **and** identity –their θ values– of adopters)
 - p_θ is price charged to user with roaming value θ
- A user adopts if $U(\theta) \geq 0$

A Simple Instantiation

- Linear (positive and negative) externalities

$$U(\theta) = (1 - \theta)\gamma + d\theta x + (b - c)m - p$$



- θ : Uniformly distributed in $[0,1]$
- γ : Value of home connectivity (affected by a user's roaming frequency)
- d : Value of connectivity while roaming $d > \gamma$ (affected by both coverage x , and a user's roaming frequency θ)
- b : Compensation for providing access to roaming traffic (proportional to volume of roaming traffic m)
- c : Impact of volume of roaming traffic, m , on user connectivity
- m : Roaming traffic uniformly distributed across users' home connections
- p : Service price (identical for all users)
- Equivalent formulation: $U(\theta) = (\gamma - p) + (b - c)m + \theta(dx - \gamma)$

In the paper we use $d \sim 2\gamma$, so that

$$U(\theta) = k + lm + \theta(2x - 1), \text{ where } k = (\gamma - p)/\gamma \text{ and } l = (b - c)/\gamma$$

Adoption Model & Evolution

- A simple discrete time model
 - Adoption level at epoch $n+1$, x_{n+1} , is determined by adoption *state* at epoch n , X_n (a two-dimensional quantity – number x_n *and type* y of adopters)
 - users evaluate their utility based on X_n and adopt if it is non-negative, *i.e.*, $X_{n+1} = H(X_n)$
- Adoption evolves based on the shape and position of the function(s) $H(X)$ relative to X
 - Different functions before and after a transition to a state of high/low adoption
- Equilibria correspond to $H(X) = X$ (or $H(0) \leq 0$, or $H(0) \geq 1$)




Adoption Outcomes

- Associated with different regions of the (k, l) plane
 - $U(\theta) = k + lm + \theta(2x - 1)$
- Various possible combinations of equilibria or absence thereof

Cases	$[0, 1/2)$	$[1/2, 1]$
1	—	—
2	●	—
2'	○	—
3	—	●
3'	—	○
4	●, ○	—
5	—	●, ○
6	●, ○	●
7	●	●, ○
8	●, ○	●, ○


Recall that $k = (\gamma - p)/\gamma$ and $l = (b - c)/\gamma$




Representative Outcomes (1)

Absence of Equilibria

$H(X)$ functions




Adoption Evolution




Representative Outcomes (2)

Single Stable Equilibrium (Low Adoption)

$H(X)$ functions




Adoption Evolution




Representative Outcomes (3)

Single Stable Equilibrium (High Adoption)

$H(X)$ functions




Adoption Evolution







Representative Outcomes (4)

Two Stable Equilibria (High & Low Adoption)




Adoption Evolution(s)



Summarizing Outcomes

- Three main “types” of behaviors
 1. No or unlikely convergence to a stable adoption equilibrium
 - Primarily in regions where roaming traffic has a strong negative impact that creates boom-and-bust cycles
 2. Convergence to a global, stable equilibrium
 - Convergence can be to either low or high adoption depending on how valuable connectivity is
 3. Convergence to one of two possible stable equilibria depending on initial adoption (seeding)
 - Impact of roaming traffic is low, but so is value of connectivity
 - Without enough of an initial critical mass, adoption never takes off
 - Large enough seeding helps overcome initial inertia

An Evolution Snapshot




On the Impact of Incentives

- Recall a user's utility function
 - $U(\theta) = k + lm + \theta(2x - 1)$, for $\gamma=1$,
 where $k = 1 - p$ and $l = b - c$, with b
 corresponding to incentives to
 offset the impact of roaming traffic
- At equilibrium bm is equivalent to a
 decrease in price, *i.e.*, $p' = p - bm$,
 but impact on adoption dynamics
 can be significant, *i.e.*, because of
 the possible introduction of a
second low adoption equilibrium

$$(k_1, l_1) = (1 - p_1, -c), \text{ i.e., } b=0$$

$$(k_2, l_2) = (1 - (p_1 + bm), b - c)$$



- In general, UPC adoption can
 be difficult to predict in the
 presence of multiple equilibria



Results Robustness

- Both users' utility and adoption processes are overly simplified, even if they capture key aspects
- Are the results affected when relaxing the model's assumptions?
 - Non-linear externality functions
 - Non-uniform roaming characteristics
 - A more realistic (diffusion-like) adoption process
- Assessing behavior of relaxed models must be done numerically
- Adoption trajectories can differ and region boundaries shift, but general outcomes remain unchanged

Shifting Regions Boundaries

Unimodal roaming ($\theta=1$) and non-linear externalities


Unimodal roaming ($\theta=0$) and linear externalities




A Diffusion-like Adoption Model

Two levels of initial penetration (seeding)

No seeding



>50% initial seeding



Summary and Next Steps

- Basic model helps identify range of outcomes for UPC adoption, and impact of exogenous parameters
 - High sensitivity to roaming traffic can disrupt adoption even when connectivity is highly desirable
 - Unless value of connectivity is high, adoption may never gather enough of a critical mass for the service to succeed (potential impact of incentives)
- Obvious next step is to use the results to understand how to best set service prices
- Additionally, the results point to the limitations of a single price policy
 - Must be low enough to foster initial adoption, which fails to extract the higher final service value when adoption is high
 - A natural “fix” is to use a two-tier pricing, *i.e.*, introductory pricing followed by higher pricing when adoption becomes high enough
 - How do we set both prices and when do we switch to the higher price?